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Abstract 
This paper, based on discourse analysis of policy documents, departs from a critique of the 
juxtaposition of the terms “serious” and “organised” in policies against organised crime in the UK. 
The conceptualisation of organised crime as national security threat supports our hypothesis that a 
similar critique can be applied to the emerging narrative of cyber-organised crime in the country. We 
argue that, whereby organised crime has become essentially “serious” as consequence of its 
characterisation as a national security threat, cyber crime is becoming “organised” in the policy 
narrative because of its seriousness. The seriousness and organisation of cyber crime justifies its 
inclusion within the national security agenda, thus accessing the procedural benefits of criminal 
intelligence assigned to national security threats. The implications associated to the evolution of such 
narratives in policy-making need to be assessed while policies are still developing.  
________________________________________________________________________
Keywords: Organised Crime, Cyber crime, Serious Crime, National Security Threat. 
 
Introduction 
In the United Kingdom (UK), at the policy level, the conceptualisation of organised 
crime
3
 has been evolving and refining over the years – as showed by the growing numbers 
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 A whole range of different crimes and groups are included within the same label of organised 
crime (Calderoni, 2010; Finckenauer, 2005). From a legal perspective, in the UK the reference 
frame for a definition of OC is the 2015 Serious Crime Act, section 45(6), according to which 
“organised crime group” means “a group that (a) has as its purpose, or as one of its purposes, the carrying on 
of criminal activities, and (b) consists of three or more persons who act, or agree to act, together to further that 
purpose”. The very low standards that have been set for inclusions of different and diverse 
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of policy documents published since 2000.
4
 These documents have been criticised as the 
result of “policy construction” based on attempts of securitisation – i.e., the social 
construction of organised crime as a threat (Carrapico, 2014) – rather than on evidence-
based observations of the evolution of organised criminality in the country (Hobbs, 2013; 
Campbell, 2014). As a result of this process, organised crime since 2010 appears in the UK 
as national security threat and, as such, it is dealt with through an enhanced national 
strategy centred on criminal intelligence (King & Sharp, 2006; HM Government, 2010; 
Sergi, 2015a). 
As we will see in the following sections, the conceptualisation of organised crime in the 
UK has pivoted around a broad and undefined notion of seriousness.
5
 This “paradigm of 
seriousness” as well as ambiguities around the notion of organised crime have been used in 
policy-making for producing consensus around increased resources and domestic powers 
(Edwards & Gill, 2006; Edwards & Levi, 2008). Arguably, defining a group of offenders as 
“organised” allows the approval of more intrusive and secretive investigative power (van 
Duyne, 2004; Levi, 2014). 
Given the increasing consensus that the cyberspace offers plenty of new possibilities for 
committing serious types of cyber crime
6
, and considering the emergence of a non-
evidence-based “cyber-organised crime” rhetoric in the international and European public 
discourse (Lavorgna, 2016), it is worth investigating whether a similar rhetoric has been 
developing also in the UK. If this is the case, the juxtaposition of “organised”, “serious”, 
and “cyber” would entail key implications for regulatory measures and policing in national 
strategies. 
The framework within which we situate our work is social constructivism applied to 
security threats. Such an approach, borrowed from the field of international relations 
(Katzenstein, 1996; Huysmans, 2004; McDonald, 2008) has already been used in the field 
                                                                                                                                                 
phenomena as organised crime have already been severely criticised in academia (Campbell, 2013, 
2014; Hobbs, 2013; Sergi, 2016). These criticisms are not new: already in the past, “organised 
crime” has been accused to be used as “a catchphrase to express the growing anxieties” on the 
expansion of illegal markets and the perceived growing undermining of the legal economy and 
political institutions (Paoli, 2002, p.51). 
4
 See for example, the 2004 Home Office’s White Paper One step ahead: a 21
st
 century strategy to 
defeat organised crime, the 2009 Cabinet Office paper Extending our reach: a comprehensive approach to 
tackling serious organised crime, or the 2010 Home Office strategy Local to Global: reducing the risk from 
organised crime. 
5
 Some definitions of “serious crime” exist but they are linked to the law and the punishability 
threshold. Consider for instance the Palermo Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, 
2(b), according to which “serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by 
a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty or the Serious 
Crime Act 2015, which punishes participation in crimes punishable with seven years 
imprisonment). In the criminological debate, the conceptualisation of “seriousness” is also linked 
to what the law classifies as “serious crimes” in terms of their potential harm to the general public 
and their degree of proximity and sophistication (Edwards and Levi, 2008). 
6
 Here broadly defined, in line with the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, as offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems (illegal access, 
illegal interception, data interference, system interference, and misuse of services); computer-
related offences (computer-related forgery and computer-related fraud); content-related offences 
(offences related to child pornography); offences related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights. 
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of drugs, asylum, and immigration among others (Huysmans, 2002), and even organised 
crime (Carrapico, 2014). It allows us to look at the topics at hand through the lenses of 
the securitisation conceptual framework (Buzan et al., 1998) and to explain the 
significance of language in national policy-making in enlarging the concept of security to 
cover also for crime issues (Farrand & Carrapico, 2012). 
In our study, based on discourse analysis of policy documents, we argue that the 
juxtaposition of the term “serious” and the term “organised” in policies on organised 
crime can be observed also in the emerging narrative of cyber-organised crime in the UK: 
there is in fact an inverted parallelism between the characterisation of organised crime as 
serious threat to national security and the developing characterisation of cyber crime as 
serious crime too, therefore organised “by default”. We argue that this juxtaposition of 
“serious” and “organised” in framing cyber crime is an example of securitisation and more 
in general can be understood as “shorthand for the construction of security” (McDonald, 
2008, p.566). Whereby organised crime has become inherently serious as consequence of 
its own securitisation process (Sergi, 2016), mirrored in its current national security 
characterisation, cyber crime is becoming organised in the policy narrative because of its 
seriousness, which shall justify its inclusion within the national security agenda as well. 
This inclusion shall mean accessing the procedural benefits of criminal intelligence paired 
to national security threats. The implications associated to the evolution of such narratives 
in policy-making need to be assessed while policies are still developing.  
This paper will first present the process of securitisation, which has allowed the 
“seriousness” of organised crime to enter successfully the national security agenda. After 
explaining our methodology, the paper will present our analysis of the language used for 
describing cyber crime in policy documents. The findings support our main argument that 
through the use of the word “serious” also the word “organised” has arbitrarily migrated 
into the conceptualisation of cyber crime.   
 
Background 
The securitisation of organised crime 
Organised crime in the UK is mainly described as a threat for the economic sector 
nationwide rather than as an issue for traditional street policing approaches (NCA, 2014a; 
Home Office, 2010a). As organised crime is detrimental for the financial health of the 
country, and any “economic deficit is also a security deficit” (Home Office, 2010b, p.4), 
organised crime has been conceptualised as a security threat since 2010, with the Home 
Office (2010b) declaring officially that organised crime – which is serious– is a threat to 
national security, thus explicitly establishing the link between national security and 
organised crime through its seriousness (Sergi, 2016). As highlighted by the Home Office 
(2013, p.7) in the latest strategy against Serious and Organised Crime, “the strategy uses 
the framework we have developed for our counter-terrorist work”, which confirms the 
national security dimension. However, this high policing approach has been criticised, as it 
incurs the risk of losing different local manifestations of organised crime (Hobbs, 2013).  
The process whereby a threat is identified as a security issue or “constructed” to create 
legitimacy and authority for dealing with that issue (Weaver, 1995; Neal, 2009) is the 
securitisation process. The way “construction” works towards securitisation can differ. It 
has been argued that by focusing on the “social significance of language” (Huysmans, 
2002, p. 44) – i.e., the idea that, by bringing social practices into a communicative 
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framework, language supports the integration of social relations – we can understand how 
the speech act can construct a security problem. For instance, in the case of organised 
crime as policy category in the UK, sentences like “organised crime is a serious threat to 
our economy” or “any threat to our economy is a security threat” are not neutral 
statements: security language is made of a body of rules like any other language (Foucault, 
1972), and the repetition of specific organisations of sentences – one sentence following 
another, one word following another – makes these enunciations security utterances. As 
Wæver argued (1995,  p. 55), “by uttering 'security', a state representative moves a 
particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means necessary to block it”. This securitisation of the UK public discourse has 
been observed for instance in the wake of the United States 9/11, London 7/7, and 
continued Islamist attacks: counterterrorism moved to the top of the policy agenda 
through the production of a narrative by policy-makers. This resulted in the proliferation 
of counterterrorism legislation, increased budgets for counterterrorism, and increased state 
powers (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Bright, 2012; Heath-Kelly 2013). 
Since organised crime has been subsumed within the national security agenda in 2010, 
there is a direct connection between the serious character of organised crime and its 
national security status. It has been already noticed (Sergi, 2016) that the “serious” 
character attached of organised crime in policy-making has supported changes in criminal 
law with the Serious Crime Act 2015, which criminalises organised crime participation. If 
a threat is serious, then the law needs to intervene also through criminalisation.  
The process of securitisation of organised crime is not just a recent trend (Campbell, 
2014). Historically, organised crime in the UK has been paired with serious crime since the 
late 1990s, when the National Criminal Intelligence Service included in its annual national 
threat assessment an evaluation of both serious and organised crime (NCIS, 2000). With 
the use of the word serious in the Serious and Organised Crime Policing Act 2005 
establishing the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA, replaced in 2013 by the 
National Crime Agency (NCA)), a “paradigm of seriousness” officially became a 
quintessential feature of policy on organised crime in the country. The paradigm of 
seriousness can be defined as a pattern of assertions supporting the underlying idea that 
most serious crimes ought to be organised as well as most organised crimes (emphasis on the 
plural) raise concerns because of their seriousness (Sergi, 2016). 
From a policing perspective, the marriage between serious and organised has been 
strengthened also because of the difficulty in securing convictions against “organised 
criminals”; the focus on the seriousness of crimes that are also organised has disregarded 
the proof of the organisational character of criminal groups for the purposes of crime 
classification (Campbell, 2013; Sergi, 2014, 2015b). This aspect has been reviewed in the 
latest Serious Crime Act 2015, with the new offence for participation in organised crime 
groups’ activities (Sergi, 2016).
7
 In essence, in order to be prosecuted through the support 
of criminal intelligence agencies (namely the NCA), a crime needs to be serious enough 
(Campbell, 2013). 
                                                 
7
 The new Serious Crime Act 2015, at section 45(4b) describes activities of organised crime groups 
as offences punishable “with imprisonment for a term of 7 years or more”, thus serious offences. 
The focus, in line with Sergi’s “Activity Model” (Sergi, 2014, 2015a), is on the criminal activity, 
identified as serious through its sentencing classification. 
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The link between the “seriousness” of crimes and their “organised” character has been 
also established through the ranking of criminal threats in the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM) as developed since the 1990s by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS, 
2000). There are three levels of policing based on risk and harm and linked to the criminal 
capacity of groups: (1) single-jurisdictional for local issues (gang crimes), (2) multi-
jurisdictional for cross-border issues, and (3) national and international for “serious and 
organised” crime (Centrex, 2007, p.12). This is reflected in the National Security Strategy 
(Home Office, 2010b), which also classifies organised crime both within tier 2 priority 
risks (as nationally born and bred threat) and within tier 3 priority risks (as threat coming 
from abroad). In common understanding, therefore, the seriousness of organised crime 
equates to the sophistication of criminal networks. 
In a securitisation framework that looks at the language of security constructivism, it is 
not indifferent that in its 2013 Serious Organised Crime Strategy the Home Office approved 
the label of “serious” in addition to “organised” (serious + organised). This choice was 
clearly linked to the necessity of centring the strategy on the “seriousness” rather than the 
“organisation” of crimes. As the Home Office (2013, p. 13) declared: 
 
This strategy for dealing with serious and organised crime is issued to coincide 
with the creation of the NCA. It reflects significant changes in organised crime 
and […] also sets out our response to serious crime, which may not always be 
‘organised’ but requires a national response, notably many aspects of fraud and 
child sexual exploitation.  
 
Hence, not all serious crimes are organised. On the other hand, there might be 
organised crimes not serious enough to be dealt with at the national level instead (such as 
organised pick pocketing). Overall, the Home Office suggests a focus on serious crimes, 
both organised and not organised, but not the opposite: only organised crimes which are 
serious are part of the strategy and fall within the scope of the NCA. This is essentially 
justified by the necessity to centralise investigations within criminal intelligence agencies 
with all the benefits that “reserved matters” of national security entail for law enforcement 
(Home Office, 2013, p. 13). The focus on criminal intelligence to counter organised 
criminal networks advocated by the Home Office and the National Security Strategy, 
indeed, opens a number of doors and resources for law enforcement (van Duyne, 2004; 
Edwards & Levi, 2008). For example, this includes a national, rather than regional or local 
approach, with more funding available and also an increased secrecy in terms of freedom 
of information procedures. This also contributes to an alarm related to financial crimes and 
economic repercussions of certain large-scale crime that bring large-scale investigations 
and the possibility to recover proceeds (Sergi, 2016). It would be difficult – without 
intelligence data and beyond the immediate benefits for policing – to actually understand 
whether the securitisation process of organised crime happened because of rational 
reactions from the authority to secret intelligence data or out of other contingencies. 
However, this process is not unique to the UK: similar securitisation attempts took place 
for instance at the EU level, which gradually expanded its counter-organised crime efforts 
through both political and legal instruments (Carrapico, 2014; Lavorgna, 2016). 
Therefore, literature on this subject can be a good starting point for such an enquiry. 
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Framing “cyber-organised crime” 
There is increasing consensus that the cyberspace offers plenty of new possibilities for 
committing serious types of crime, including crimes traditionally associated with organised 
crime (Europol, 2015). Research in the US, for instance, showed a growing public 
concern with the seriousness of certain cyber crimes (e.g., financially motivated crimes 
such as Internet frauds) and the criminal justice ability to control it (Burns et al., 2004; 
Rebovich, & Layne, 2010; Bossler & Holt, 2012). In the UK, it has been suggested that, 
while different cyber crimes are dealt with differently in policing depending on their 
perceived seriousness by public, political, and expert assessments (Yar, 2013), there is 
overall a general concern, propagated by the media, that the Internet is dangerous and 
criminogenic (Wall, 2008). Hence, it is not surprising that cyber crime is receiving 
increasing attention, also at the policy level. Problematically, the use of a seriousness 
connotation – that is, cyber crime is a serious type of crime – has led to an assumption of 
the organisational character of certain manifestations of cyber crime (among others, Rider, 
2001; Europol, 2015). 
We argue that, in the same way the “serious” character of organised crime has bought 
the phenomenon a place among national security threat, the juxtaposition of “serious” and 
“organised” can trigger the securitisation of cyber crime. Even if we agree that cyber 
crime is serious, is it correct to infer that it is often organised? The answer, we argue, is 
not. The existing evidence-based criminological literature has not yet sufficiently 
addressed the nature and the rate of criminal adaptability. There are only a few studies 
(such as Lusthaus, 2013; Hutchings, 2014; Lavorgna, 2015; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna, & 
Kleemans, 2016) focusing on the presence of both traditional organised crime and newly 
formed criminal groups in cyberspace. The scarce research on this topic, even when of 
great criminological interest, is mostly of speculative or anecdotal nature (see, among 
others, Brenner, 2002; McCusker, 2006; Choo & Smith, 2007). The issue seems to be 
linked to the technical specialism required to collect and analyse data from the web, often 
through the use of computer science. Some recent studies have carried out more 
systematic analyses (for instance, McGuire, 2012). However, scholars are cautious in their 
conclusions and tend to stress how more detailed data and analyses are needed: most of the 
existing studies are in fact mostly based on secondary sources whose accuracy might be 
questionable. Also, they often adopt very broad working definitions of “organised crime”.
8
 
As known in organised crime studies, extremely low standards for inclusions of different 
and diverse phenomena as “organised crime” eventually turn the concept into “an empty 
signifier” (Carrapico, 2014, p. 11).  
Inferences from these studies about the presence of organised crime in cyberspace can 
be misleading: online criminal opportunities might be exploited also by sole offenders, and 
there is still scarce evidence as to whether new criminal actors created organised groups in 
cyberspace and/or traditional organised crime groups operate in online marketplaces. 
Rather, evidence points in the direction of the presence in cyberspace of loose, flat, and 
fluid networks, generally without a common functional unit (Martin, 2014; Wall, 2014, 
2015). Despite the lack of clear evidence on the presence of organised crime groups in 
cyberspace, however, a cyber-organised crime narrative has been developing over the last 
decade also in policy documents at the European and international level, where the notion 
                                                 
8
 For a more complete critical review of the literature on cyber organised crime, see also Lavorgna, 
2016 and Leukfeldt, Lavorgna, & Kleemans (2016). 
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of cyber-organised crime has been used to emphasise certain security threats as they 
“ought to be” organised crime (Lavorgna, 2016). Once again (van Duyne, 2004; van 
Duyne & Vander Beken, 2009) the vague concept of organised crime seems to be used in 
order to make the case for strong crime repression. 
 
Methodology 
In this study, we carried out a discourse analysis of UK policy-making documents to 
assess whether and to what extent the cyber-organised crime narrative has been 
developing in the country. Official outputs from the major relevant agencies and 
institutions addressing the possible intersections between organised crime and cyber crime 
at the national level were identified by looking at the documents, press speeches, and press 
sections of their online databases through a keyword search ((cyber OR internet OR web) 
AND organis*). We run the searches in the websites of the Home Office and the NCA 
(and its predecessor SOCA),
9
 the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS), the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS, the Scotland's 
Prosecution Service), the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (PPS), the 
National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC, former Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO)), the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP), the 
Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police,
10
 Police Scotland, and the Police Service 
for Northern Ireland. Documents published until 30
st
 April 2016 were taken into 
consideration, for a total of 1693 results. Once the documents were identified, they were 
manually sorted out to dismiss those that were not relevant to this study. The final sample 
size for the analysis comprised 92 documents.
11
 The accuracy of the study is limited by the 
fact that the webpages of the selected agencies might not necessarily constitute archives of 
the whole relevant content ever published, and we have not considered all possible policy 
making agents. However, to minimise these limitations, we kept the keyword searches as 
comprehensive as possible and we covered all major relevant agencies and institutions in 
the UK. 
Detailed coding was carried out throughout the files to capture, classify, and sort the 
relevant content. This data-dependent process took into consideration a wide variety of 
diverse themes and information, summarised in Table 1. NVivo, a data analysis software 
                                                 
9
 As regards the SOCA, given that it no longer exists, documents were retrieved via the database 
that can be found at the following link: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/serious-
organised-crime-agency. 
10
 The Metropolitan Police was chosen as the largest one in England and Wales, and the one with 
national competence and powers in complex organised crime investigations. The City of London 
Police was chosen because it is the main police force dealing with financial crimes including those 
committed online. 
11
 Home Office: 311 results, 34 relevant. National Crime Agency (NCA): 125 results, 24 relevant. 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA): 11 results, 4 relevant. Serious Fraud Office (SFO): 
7 results, 0 relevant. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): 463 results, 3 relevant. The Crown Office 
and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS): 4 results, 0 relevant. The Public Prosecution Service for 
Northern Ireland (PPS): 0 results, 0 relevant. National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC): 138 
results, 4 relevant. Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP): 34 result, 3 
relevant. Metropolitan Police: 62 results, 5 relevant. City of London Police: 35 results, 13 relevant. 
Police Scotland: 18 results, 2 relevant. Police Service for Northern Ireland: 485 results, 0 relevant. 
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package that allows managing and arranging unstructured information, was used to 
systematically organise and analyse the data sampled. 
 
Table 1. Coding scheme 
 
CATEGORIES SUB-CATEGORIES 
INSTITUTION Home Office; NCA; SOCA; CPS; NPCC; MetPolice; City of 
London Police; Police Scotland 
TYPE OF 
DOCUMENT 
News/press release (focus on: specific law enforcement operation, 
quote, reference to report/official announcement); report/strategy; 
speech; website; blog; policy paper; minutes 
YEAR From 2010 to 2016 
WHAT (criminal 
activity discussed 
in the document) 
Arms trafficking; counterfeit and pirated goods; drug trafficking; 
fraud; general cyber crime; hate crime; human trafficking; malware; 
money laundering; pedopornography 
ORGANISED 
CRIME (what 
“organised 
crime” is about, 
its relationship 
with the “cyber” 
component) 
Organised crime group; cyber crime as OC activity; cyber crime as 
OC threat; cyber crime for OC funding 
 
In the analysis, special attention was given to the framing
12
 and the evolution of the 
discourse, in line with our theoretical approach. Indeed, the language used in policy 
documents to present a crime issue is of key importance to gain a better understanding of 
its social construction by policy makers towards political decision makers, law 
enforcement, and the broader public (Druckman, 2001; Stritzel, 2012; Carrapico, 2014). 
It should be underlined that our study analyses an emerging narrative as it develops, hence 
it has the intrinsic limitation of information being incomplete and potentially broadening 
as we proceed. Consequently, the analysis has to be cautious. Nonetheless, as it will be 
further discussed in the conclusive section of this paper, we believe it is important to 
analyse, interpret, and in case debunk policy discourse before it crystallises in a certain 
security language or it further sets policy agendas, with important consequences in terms 
of resource allocation and action prioritisation.  
 
Results 
Institution and type of document 
The Home Office (34 documents), the NCA (24 documents) and the City of London 
Police (13 documents) were by far the agencies that used more the cyber-organised crime 
narrative, followed by the Metropolitan Police (5 documents), SOCA and the NCPP (4 
documents each), the CPS (3 documents), CEOP (3 documents), and Police Scotland (2 
documents). No relevant documents were found in the other agencies considered. 
                                                 
12
 Defined as “the process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular 
social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” 
(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p. 222). 
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Most of the documents analysed are news or press releases (44 documents), followed by 
reports or strategy-setting documents (20), speeches (14), website pages (10), blog entries 
by law enforcement officers and policy makers (2), policy papers (1), and meeting minutes 
(1). However, if we look more in detail into the “news or press releases” category, we 
discover that only 19 documents link organised crime and cyber crime in reporting a 
specific law enforcement operation. Among these, only in 5 cases the cyber-organised 
crime narrative is not part of a quote by national policy makers or law enforcement 
officers. The remaining documents (therefore 14 documents) rely on this narrative by 
making references to official announcements, speeches, or other published reports. Hence, 
there is a clear prevalence in using the cyber-organised crime narrative in sources 
presenting an official discourse. This suggests an attempt to expand the counter-cyber 
crime efforts through the superimposition of the notion of cyber-organised crime 
(Lavorgna, 2016), similarly to what happened with the organised crime narrative in the 
past (Paoli, 2002). 
 
Year 
No documents using or suggesting a narrative of cyber-organised crime were found 
before 2010. The number of relevant documents is rather scarce in the time period 
stretching from 2010 to 2012 (with respectively 2, 6, and 6 documents) even if, for 
instance, already the former SOCA in its reports warned about “the threat of technology-
enabled organised crime” (SOCA, 2011, p.16). From 2013 onwards, the number of 
relevant documents significantly increased, reaching its highest number in 2013 (22 
documents), and counting high numbers also in the following years (19 in 2014, 20 in 
2015, and 17 until the end of April 2016, which suggests that a new peak will be reached 
in 2016). It is worth noting that 2013 was the year when the NCA – the UK's lead 
national agency against serious and organised crime – was launched, assuming a number of 
responsibilities of other agencies. 
Figure 1 below shows the clear increase in the number of references, and specifies their 
type. Please note that for the year 2016 only documents released until 30 April were taken 
into consideration. 
 
Figure 1 – Type and number of references per year 
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What 
Most documents, when linking cyber crime and organised crime, deal with cyber 
crime in general (49 documents), without making any reference to specific cases but rather 
treating cyber crime as a hodgepodge of serious criminal activities and assuming the 
organisational aspect. Consider for instance the following example, where the criminal 
activities gathered under the cyber crime umbrella are so diverse that potential victims can 
range from banking systems to abused children: 
 
Cyber crime is no longer about those who seek to access computer systems for 
fun or to prove it can be done. The criminals behind such crimes are organised, 
and seek to take advantage of those using Internet services. Whether this is for 
• nancial gain, or as threats to children, the effect on the victims can be 
devastating” (Home Office, 2010c, p.4, forward by the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State for Crime Reduction).  
 
Similarly, in the following example, the Minister of Internet Safety and Security 
emphasises the criminogenic features that cyberspace offers with particular reference to 
organised crime groups: 
 
Advances in technology offer criminals, particularly organised criminals, the scope to 
commit new types of crimes on an unprecedented scale and across jurisdictions 
(Shields, 2016). 
 
It is worth noting that these policy documents rarely disclose their methodology and 
share their primary data, making it practically impossible to check effectively their findings 
against evidence. 
Online frauds (23 documents), pedopornography (10 documents), malware (including 
ransomware, 6 documents), Internet-facilitated drug trafficking (6 documents), counterfeit 
and pirated goods (6 documents), Internet-facilitated human trafficking (2 documents), 
money laundering (1 document), and arms trafficking (1 document) follow in number. 
There is an apparent contradiction with recent critical research showing how most 
criminal actors in cyberspace do not gather in well-defined organisational units or 
enterprises (among others, Lavorgna, 2015; Wall, 2015; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna, & Kleemans, 
2016). This can be explained if we notice that most documents use a very general 
language, mostly without reference to particular cases when linking specific cyber crime 
activities to organised crime. Consider for instance the following snippet, where a direct 
relationship between the online sale of counterfeit goods and “other” organised crime is 
assumed: 
 
Many fraudsters will use the proceeds from selling counterfeit goods to fund other 
types of serious organised crime (City of London Police, 2016). 
 
Conversely, the following excerpt suggests the involvement of organised crime groups 
in a variety of serious criminal activities: 
 
The scale of the threat from serious and organised crime has been demonstrated by 
high pro• le cases of child sexual exploitation; growing use of cyber techniques by 
organised criminals to commit fraud and trade illegal drugs and • rearms on the 
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internet; and the spread of banking malware responsible for losses of hundreds of 
millions of pounds” (Home Office, 2015, p. 5, forward by the Home Secretary). 
 
Once again, this reinforces the interpretation that “organised” is used en passant as an 
attribute of crimes being perceived as serious. 
 
Organised Crime 
If we consider what it is meant by “organised crime” when paired with a cyber-related 
attribute, the analysis shows that in most cases it is somehow implied that (traditional, 
offline) organised crime groups operate online (55 references). For instance, in the words of 
Home Secretary Theresa May (Home Office, 2014), “someone who is scammed on the 
internet, or finds their computer infected by malware that harvests their personal and 
financial data to be sold into criminal markets, or finds they have spent their savings on 
fake shares – all these activities can be traced back to organised crime”. 
However, apart from rare cases (5 documents) when reference to organised crime was 
made to mention a specific law enforcement operation (see subsection Institution and type of 
document above), the documents never refer to a specific organised crime group. A total of 
22 references consider cyber crime as a specific type of organised crime activity, and 5 
references imply that cyber crimes activities are somehow a funding source for traditional 
organised crime groups. This is in line with the “Activity” focus of the organised crime 
strategy in the UK that has already been critiqued as it leads to logical fallacies (Sergi, 
2015a; 2016). Finally, 17 references define explicitly cyber-organised crime as a specific 
type of threat. Hence, similarly to what has been observed in policy making at the 
European and international level, the cyber-organised narrative seems to foster definitional 
ambiguities (Lavorgna, 2016). In addition, it completely ignores the conceptualisation of 
organised crime as power, seeking a social function through the control over the 
production and distribution of a certain commodities in the underworld, protection 
services, or an alliance with political and economic elites (von Lampe, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
We argue that in the documents analysed the adjective “organised” is often used as 
synonym of “serious”, in line with a successful paradigm of seriousness, tool of a 
securitisation process of cyber crime. Seriousness is intended as sophistication, as described 
above. This narrative seeks no longer to qualitatively assess the distinct features of 
organised crime in the case of cyber crime. Rather, the “organised” feature is linked to the 
seriousness of certain online criminal activities. For instance, the NCA Deputy Director 
McComb commented the arrest of some suspected of setting up Silk Road 2.0 (a criminal 
marketplace in the so-called deep web, the part of the web that is not indexed by standard 
search engines and therefore is hidden from the wider public) as follows: 
 
Criminals like to think that the dark web provides a safe, anonymous haven but in 
reality this is just like any other organised crime network. It may take time and effort 
to investigate and build a criminal case, but we are determined to identify and 
prosecute people caught dealing drugs and committing serious crime using the dark 
web (NCA, 2014b).  
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The underlying logic is that cyber crime is highly harmful and entails several risks: it is 
therefore serious and as such falls in the above-mentioned level 3 of the NIM, where it 
meets and overlaps with organised crime. It is understandable to give (certain) cyber 
crimes national security relevance. However, by using “organised” as an intensifier, 
criminal policy presumes a character of cyber crime that is not substantiated by research. 
The same is-ought fallacy
13
identified by Sergi (2015a) in institutional language and with 
reference to the seriousness paradigm for organised crime can therefore be recognised also 
in this case, where the notion of cyber-organised crime is used to establish a new security 
threat and therefore to justify the inclusion of cyber crime under the national security 
umbrella. In the same way organised crime ought to be a threat to national security because 
it is serious, cyber crime ought to be a threat to national security threat as well because it is 
(described as) “organised” without much empirical evidence supporting the overlapping of 
the two crime categories. In other words, cyber crime fits the seriousness paradigm: it can 
become a national security threat because of its seriousness; its seriousness however is 
inferred also by an unsubstantiated “organised” character. Hence, the label “organised 
crime” is once again assigned to certain criminal activities associated to a particular risk 
and/or harm as they were a unique threat (“the ought to be”) in order to make them a 
matter of national security. In so doing, we lose sight of the fact that organised crime 
(from an historical, criminological, and “law in action” perspective) should refer to certain 
types of unlawful associations (“what is”), and ignores the conceptualisation of organised 
crime as power (von Lampe, 2008).  
As a consequence, within law enforcement agencies and especially the NCA, the fight 
against cyber crime has been subsumed within the more general fight against organised 
crime. This is clearly symbolised by the creation of the National Cyber Crime Unit as a 
specialised team within the NCA, using NCA officers and resources. The cyber-organised 
crime narrative, because of the seriousness attached to the risks and harms of cyber crime, 
has de facto turned cyber crimes of whichever nature into national security threats. Within 
the same security constructivism approach that we have observed for organised crime, 
cyber crime has been constructed first as “serious” and then as “organised” to build its 
security profile. This has been achieved throughout a reiteration of the security utterances 
in relation to cyber crime in policy documents citing each other and referring to each 
other in circles. Another good example can be found in the linguistic shift used to justify 
the fact that the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) became an 
integral part of the NCA. While the CEOP itself (2012, p.5) stressed its “understanding of 
the similarities between organised crime and a large amount of child sexual exploitation 
and abuse” in justifying its becoming part of the NCA, it then made clear that “[…] often 
where true group offending does occur, this shares few of the characteristics traditionally 
associated with organised crime. Child sexual exploitation and abuse offending is, 
however, often extremely serious and complex in both execution and impact” (CEOP, 
2013, p.6). Therefore, the seriousness of the criminal activity was the ground to use the 
organised crime connotation, and the organised crime narrative was used to give reason 
for merging within a national intelligence agency. 
                                                 
13
 The “is-ought” fallacy of Hume’s Law identifies a logical fallacy when from a “to be” 
characteristic of a certain phenomenon are derived “ought to be” characteristics without a proper 
justification. 
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Eventually, the common denominator between serious, organised, and cyber crimes 
(emphasis on the plural) – the national security connotation – also comes with yet another 
bonus, which is the peculiar attachment to disruption and prevention as key policing 
strategies of the National Crime Agency and its units. As it happened for organised crime 
– where the organisational characteristics of group criminal activities were assumed but 
eventually difficult to prosecute (Campbell, 2013; Sergi, 2016) – cyber crime too poses 
challenges from a juridical point of view: prosecution and investigation of cyber crimes is 
neither simple, nor straightforward (Brown, 2015; Dragan, 2015). Not only the amount of 
work required to follow crimes online explodes the limits of common police workload, 
but also it is not bound by traditional jurisdiction borders. In other words, disrupting and 
preventing cyber crime – by focusing on reducing the harm within the jurisdictional 
boundaries – is a much easier choice to distribute police work and success. In order to 
secure a focus on disruption, criminal intelligence agencies must be involved and in order 
to do so a national security connotation is needed too. The argument is again circular: 
cyber crime is “serious” because it poses complex issues to common policing. Moreover, 
it needs to be “organised” to fall within the remit of criminal intelligence agencies. The 
need to fall within the remit of criminal intelligence agencies is justified to secure the 
national security connotation and therefore the possibility to employ disruption 
techniques. As it has been observed, “disruption is a way of overcoming some of the 
problems encountered by police organizations in coping with heavy workloads” (Innes & 
Sheptycki, 2004, p.13). This seems to be the case for both organised crime and cyber 
crime and the challenges they pose to investigators and prosecutors.  
 
Conclusion 
One could argue that a commonality of understanding is more important than 
definitory precision, but in the case of cyber-organised crime this does not seem to be the 
case. In this new binary relationship cyber/organised, the threshold to consider something 
as “organised crime” is lowered, if possible, even more than it was for other serious and 
organised criminal activities in the country. As already remarked by Lusthaus (2013), there 
is the need to apply scholarly rigour to the question of whether criminals operating in 
cyberspace can fit formal definitions of organised crime. Without denying the possibility 
of organised crime groups increasingly operating online and of the creation of new 
organised crime groups in cyberspace, limited reliable data available do not allow to draw 
an exact comparison between the existing offline criminological categorisations and the 
new online phenomena (Lavorgna, 2015). The risk is that the cyber-OC narrative 
crystallises not because of new compelling evidence but because of a vicious circle, a 
mechanism of cross-fertilisation of sources and references. Overall, it seems the case that 
official sources of information are succumbing to the temptation to deploy the vague 
concept of organised in order to make the case for effective crime repression (in line with 
Lavorgna, 2016). The problem with the crystallisation of this security language is in setting 
and confirming a security agenda, which carries important consequences in terms of 
resource distribution and action prioritisation. From a policing perspective, the 
categorisation of cyber crime as “organised” crime, as said, carries a number of 
consequences. If cyber crime is by default organised crime, law enforcement will be called 
to act within the preferred tools of disruption and prevention rather than common 
policing strategies, which might be at times more appropriate (in cases for example of 
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support to victims). The high policing approach that is typical of national security threats 
carries an enhanced focus on the perpetrators of crimes and on the crime types. This 
means that issues like victimisation, radicalisation, social networks’ relations and social 
harm at the local level struggle to come to the surface and require ad hoc plans and 
partnerships to function (Home Office, 2013).  
However, the risk is not solely one of confusing terminology or definitions. Indeed, 
the law tends to follow up on evolving and established policy narrative. The Serious 
Crime Act 2015 is the perfect example of the crystallisation of a security paradigm and the 
seriousness connotation for organised crime in criminal law (Sergi, 2016). The new 
Serious Crime Act 2015, at section 45 (participation in activities of organised crime 
groups, see footnotes 1 and 5), represents the counterpart in criminal law of the narrative 
that has been employing terminology of serious and organised crime to construct a 
national security threat. On one side, organised crime (because of the seriousness 
paradigm) has been affirmed as a national security threat in criminal policy; on the other 
side, this affirmation is now the basis of new criminal law provisions. The new offence, in 
fact, almost entirely borrowing from the international legal framework (especially the UN 
Palermo Convention of 2000), lowers the threshold for organised crime at the point of 
being over inclusive of virtually every type of (serious) gang-style crime. Therefore, 
ambiguities of the language and the presumption of seriousness have made organised crime 
an over-inflated concept. Considering the emerging discourses on cyber crime, there is a 
risk that a similar crystallisation of cyber crime as a too general and empty signifier might 
also occur. Cyber crime is an umbrella term that covers for a broad range of criminal 
activities, carried out by different actors and characterised by different levels of 
“seriousness”; a presumption of seriousness or organisation could lower the threshold for 
virtually all crimes with a cyber component to be considered as a national security threat.  
All the actors involved in the framing of an emerging security issue, including those at 
the policy level, should be careful and rigorous in the terminology employed. This is not a 
judgement on the operational capability of law enforcement, but rather a critical statement 
of their outputs in policy documents. The risk, otherwise, is that evolutions in criminal 
panorama will just shift attention and resources from the current fight against organised 
crime without a serious reflection on how to adapt the traditional criminological 
paradigms to better meet new security challenges in an effective and efficient way. The 
current use of the cyber-organised crime narrative should be at least problematised. As it is 
used now it does not allow for a sufficient level of understanding in public and scientific 
debates, while the juxtaposition of organised crime and cyber crime – united only by their 
seriousness characterisation –  risks missing out the real picture of both phenomena. 
 
References 
Bossler, A. M., & Holt, T. J. (2012). Patrol officers' perceived role in responding to 
cybercrime. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 35(1), 
165-181. 
Brenner, S. W. (2002). Organized cybercrime? How cyberspace may affect the structure 
of criminal relationships. North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, 4(1), 1-50. 
Bright, J. (2012). Securitisation, terror, and control: towards a theory of the breaking 
point. Review of International Studies, 38(4), 861-879. 
Brown, C. S. (2015). Investigating and Prosecuting Cyber Crime: Forensic Dependencies 
and Barriers to Justice. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 9(1), 55-73. 
Lavorgna & Sergi – Serious, therefore Organised? A Critique of the Emerging “Cyber-Organised Crime” Rhetoric in 
the United Kingdom
 
© 2016 International Journal of Cyber Criminology (Diamond Open Access Journal). Under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License 
 
 
184
Burns, R. G., Withworth, K. H., & Thompson, C.Y. (2004). Assessing law enforcement 
preparedness to address Internet fraud. Journal of Criminal Justice, 32(5), 477-493. 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Cabinet Office (2009). Extending our reach: a comprehensive approach to tackling serious 
organised crime. London: Home Office. 
Campbell, L. (2013). Organised crime and the law: a comparative analysis. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. 
Campbell, L. (2014). Organized Crime and National Security: A Dubious Connection? 
New Criminal Law Review, 17(2). 
Carrapico, H. (2014). Analysing the European Union's responses to organized crime 
through different securitization lenses, European Security, 23(4), 601-661. 
CENTREX (2007). Practice Advice: Introduction to Intelligence-Led Policing, on behalf of 
Association of Chief Police Officers. Wyboston, England: National Centre for Policing 
Excellence. 
CEOP (2012). Threat Assessment of child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. London: Child 
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.  
CEOP (2013). Threat Assessment of child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. London: Child 
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.  
Choo, K. K. R., & Smith, R. G. (2007). Criminal exploitation of online systems by 
organised crime groups. Asian Journal of Criminology, 3(1), 37–59. 
City of London Police (2016). Counterfeit Goods. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-
crime/pipcu/Pages/counterfeit-goods.aspx. 
Dragan, A. T. (2015). Procedural Aspects of Cybercrime Investigation. Journal of Legal 
Studies, 16(30), 55-66. 
Druckman, J. N. (2001). The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence. 
Political Behavior, 23(3), 225-256. 
Edwards, A., & Gill, P. (2006). After Transnational Organised Crime? The Politics of 
Public Safety. In: A. Edwards & P. Gill (Eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: 
Perspectives on Global Security (pp. 264-282). London: Routledge. 
Edwards, A., & Levi, M. (2008). Researching the organization of serious crimes. 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 8(4), 363-388. 
Europol (2015). Internet facilitated organized crime (IOCTA). The Hague: European Police 
Office.  
Farrand, B., & Carrapico, H. (2012). Copyright law as a matter of (inter)national security? 
The attempt to securitise commercial infringement and its spill over onto individual 
liability. Crime Law Soc Change, 57(4), 373–401. 
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. New 
York: Pantheons Books. 
Heath-Kelly, C. (2013). Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 
“Radicalisation” Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy. The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 15(3), 394-415.  
HM Government (2010). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy. London: The Stationery Office. 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology 
Vol 10 Issue 2 July – December 2016 
 
© 2016 International Journal of Cyber Criminology (Diamond Open Access Journal). Under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License 
 
 
185
Hobbs, D. (2013). Lush life: constructing organised crime in the UK. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Home Office (2004). One step ahead: a 21
st
 century strategy to defeat organised crime.  London: 
Home Office. 
Home Office (2010a). Local to Global: reducing the risk from organised crime. London: Home 
Office. 
Home Office (2010b). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy. London: The stationery office. 
Home Office (2010c). Cyber Crime Strategy. London: The stationery office. 
Home Office (2013). Serious organised crime strategy. London: The Stationery Office. 
Home Office (2014). Home Secretary's speech “Understanding and Confronting 
Organised Crime”, delivered at the Royal United Services Institute on Wednesday 11 
June. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-
speech-on-organised-crime-at-rusi.  
Home Office (2015). The serious and organised crime strategy: annual report for 2014. London: 
The Stationery Office.  
Hutchings, A. (2014). Crime from the keyboard: organised cybercrime, co-offending, 
initiation and knowledge transmission. Crime, Law and Social Change, 62(1), 1–20. 
Huysmans, J. (2002). Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative 
Dilemma of Writing Security. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 41-62. 
Huysmans, J. (2004). Minding Exceptions: Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy. 
Contemporary Political Theory, 3(3), 321–41. 
Huysmans, J., & Buonfino, A. (2008). Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, 
Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK. Political Studies, 56(4), 
766-788. 
Innes, M., & Sheptycki, J. W. E. (2004). From Detection to Disruption: Intelligence and 
the Changing Logic of Police Crime Control in the United Kingdom. International 
Criminal Justice Review, 14, 1-18. 
Katzenstein, P. (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
King, M., & Sharp, D. (2006). Global security and policing change: the impact of 
“securitisation” on policing in England and Wales. Police Practice and Research, 7(5), 
379-390. 
Lavorgna, A. (2015). Organised crime goes online: Realities and challenges. Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, 18(2). 
Lavorgna, A. (2016). Exploring the cyber-organised crime narrative: The hunt for a new 
bogeyman? In P.C. van Duyne et al. (Eds.), Organising fears, Crime & Law Enforcement 
New horizons and trends in Europe & beyond. Oisterveijk: Wolf Legal Publishers. 
Leukfeldt E. R., Lavorgna A., & Kleemans E. R. (2016). Organised cybercrime or 
cybercrime that is organised? An assessment of the conceptualisation of financial 
cybercrime as organised crime (under review) 
Levi, M. (2014). Thinking about Organised Crime. Structure and Threat. The RUSI 
Journal, 159(1), 6-14. 
Lusthaus, J. (2013). How organised is organised cybercrime? Global Crime, 14(1), 52-60. 
Martin, J. (2014). Lost on the Silk Road: online drug distribution and the “cryptomarket”. 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 14, 351–367.  
Lavorgna & Sergi – Serious, therefore Organised? A Critique of the Emerging “Cyber-Organised Crime” Rhetoric in 
the United Kingdom
 
© 2016 International Journal of Cyber Criminology (Diamond Open Access Journal). Under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License 
 
 
186
McCusker, R. (2006). Transnational organized cyber crime: distinguishing threat from 
reality. Crime, Law and Social Change, 46(4), 257-273. 
McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal of 
International Relations, 14(4), 563–587.  
McGuire M. (2007). Hypercrime. The new geometry of harm. Oxon (UK) & New York: 
Routledge. 
NCA (2014a). National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014, London: 
The Stationery Office.  
NCA (2014b). International law enforcement deals major blow to dark web markets. 
News. Retrieved from http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/483-
international-law-enforcement-deals-major-blow-to-dark-web-markets. 
NCIS (2000). The National Intelligence Model, London: National Criminal Intelligence 
Service. 
Neal, A. W. (2009). Securitization and risk at the EU border: the origins of FRONTEX. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 333-356. 
Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties 
conflict and its effect on tolerance. American Political Science Review, 91, 567–583. 
Paoli, L. (2002). The paradoxes of organized crime. Crime, Law and Social Change, 37(1), 
51–97. 
Rebovich, D. J., & Layne, J. (with Jiandani, J. & Hage, S.) (2010). The National Public 
Survey on White Collar Crime, Morgantown, WV: National White Collar Crime 
Center. 
Rider B. A. K. (2001). Cyber-organised crime. The impact of information technology on 
organised crime. Journal of Financial Crime, 8(4), 332-346. 
Sergi, A. (2014). Structure versus Activity. Policing Organized Crime in Italy and in the 
UK, Distance and Convergence. Policing, 8(1), 69-78. 
Sergi, A. (2015a). Divergent Mind-sets, Convergent Policies. Policing Models against 
Organised Crime in Italy and in England within International Frameworks. European 
Journal of Criminology, 12(6), 568-680. 
Sergi, A. (2015b). Organised crime in English criminal law: lessons from the United States 
on conspiracy and criminal enterprise. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 18(2), 182-
201. 
Sergi, A. (2016). National security vs criminal law. Perspectives, doubts and concerns on 
the criminalisation of organised crime in England and Wales. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research (online first), 1007/s10610-016-9304-3. 
Shields, J. (2016). Baroness Shields on preventing crime in the digital age. Speech. 
Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/baroness-shields-on-
preventing-crime-in-the-digital-age. 
SOCA (2011). Annual Report 2010-11. London: The Stationery Office. 
Stritzel, H. (2012). Securitization, power, intertextuality: discourse theory and the 
translations of organized crime. Security Dialogue, 43(6), 549-567. 
van Duyne, P.C. (2004). Fears, naming and knowing: an introduction. In: P.C. van 
Duyne, M. Jager, K. von Lampe, & J. L. Newell (Eds.), Threats and phantoms of 
organised crime, corruption and terrorism. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, pp.1-21. 
van Duyne, P.C., & Vander Beken, T. (2009). The incantations of the EU organised 
crime policy making. Crime Law and Social Change, 51, 261-281. 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology 
Vol 10 Issue 2 July – December 2016 
 
© 2016 International Journal of Cyber Criminology (Diamond Open Access Journal). Under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License 
 
 
187
von Lampe, K. (2008). Organized Crime in Europe: Conceptions and Realities. Policing, 
2(1), 7-17. 
Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On 
Security (pp. 46-86) New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wall, D. (2015). Dis-organised crime: Towards a distributed model of the organisation of 
cybercrime. The European Review of Organised Crime, 2(2), 71-90. 
Wall, D.S. (2008). Cybercrime, media and insecurity: The shaping of public perceptions 
of cybercrime. International Review of Law, Computers, & Technology, 22(1-2), 45-63.  
Wall, D. S. (2014). Internet Mafias? The Dis-Organisation of Crime on the Internet. In S. 
Caneppele & F. Calderoni (Eds.), Organised Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention (pp. 
227-239). London, Springer,  
Yar, M. (2013). The policing of Internet sex offences: pluralised governance versus 
hierarchies of standing. Policing and Society, 23(4), 482-497. 
 
